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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
DETERRENCE: CONFLICTING
EVIDENCE?
BRIAN FORST*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Until 1975, belief in the deterrent value of capital punishment had
no authoritative empirical support. The studies widely cited prior to
that time, most notably those of Sellin' and Schuessler, 2 had in fact
found evidence consistent with the theory that the death penalty has no
deterrent effect. Then Isaac Ehrlich reported results of a complex
econometric analysis of aggregate United States times-series data, results
indicating that capital punishment is an effective deterrent. 3 While
Ehrlich's study has received a considerable amount of criticism, 4 it has
also received some support, 5 and was even cited by the United States
Solicitor General in briefs to the Supreme Court supporting the death
6
penalty.
With the publication of his second major empirical study on the
* Director of Research, INSLAW, Inc., Washington, D.C.; M.B.A. University of Califor-

nia at Los Angeles, 1965; B.S. University of California at Los Angeles, 1964.
The author is grateful to Professors Anthony Amsterdam and Hans Zeisel for their helpful comments on drafts of this Article. The author alone is responsible for factual errors or
lapses in logic that may remain.
I T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959).
2 Schuessler, The DeterrentInAence of the Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952).
3 Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effict of CapitalPunishment. A Question of Lift and Death, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
4 Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on CapitalPunishment,
85 YALE LJ. 187 (1975); Glaser, CapitalPunishment-Deterrentor Stimulus to Murder? Our UnexaminedDeathsandPenalties, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 317 (1978); Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent
Efect of CapitalPunishment. An Assessment ofthe Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978) [hereinafter Klein, The Deterrent Effect]; Passell &
Taylor, The Deterrent Eject of CapitalPunishment: Another View, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 445 (1977).
5 Walter Berns made the following observation on Ehrlich's time-series analysis: "His
study is not garbage." W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY
OF THE DEATH PENALTY 98 (1979).

6 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 35-38, Fowler v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 904 (1976); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 34-45, 9a-16a, Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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deterrent effect of capital punishment in 1977, Ehrlich produced further
results in support of the theory that executions deter crime in general
and homicides in particular. 7 The persuasiveness of his 1977 results,
based on cross-state data for 1940 and 1950, was heightened by their
general consistency with his earlier results and with his theoretical predictions.8 The credibility of these estimates was further enhanced by the
fact that they were shown to hold up under various subsets of observations, several alternative measures of the key independent variable (the
execution rate), alternative systems of weighting, the generalized and
ordinary least-squares regression methods, the incorporation of various
binary control variables, and the use of both FBI and vital statistics
homicide data. In Ehrlich's words, "the consistency and stability in the
results obtained upon application of efficient estimation procedures,
given the sample limitations, and their consistency with specific theorectical predictions and previous findings seem remarkable." 9
No less remarkable is the fact that Ehrlich's more recent findings
are not consistent with regression estimates of the deterrent effect of the
death penalty reported elsewhere, estimates also based on cross-state
data. It is surely in order to reconsider the cross-sectional results in light
of these apparent conflicts. Section II focuses on those conflicts.
Consideration of earlier studies in Section II provides support for
the theory that deterrent effects can be more efficiently estimated from
observations of temporal differences in the relevant variables in crosssectional data. In Section III, this procedure is applied to data from the
cross-section of states for 1960 and 1970, and the results are discussed
and compared with results of earlier analyses. The Article concludes in
Section IV with a discussion of the implications of the available evidence for the general theory of deterrence and for the applicability of
that theory to the death penalty.
II.

THE CONFLICTING EVIDENCE: WHAT LIES BENEATH IT?

Six months after the publication of Ehrlich's analysis of aggregate
time-series data for the United States, an article by Peter Passell appeared describing an analysis of data for the cross-section of states for
1950 and 1960.10 The strengths of the cross-sectional approach to esti7 Ehrlich, CapitalPunishment and Deterrence:Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85

J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977).
8 Foremost among these predictions is that the elasticity of the murder rate with respect
to the murder conviction rate will exceed, in absolute value, the elasticity of the murder rate
with respect to the conditional execution rate. Id. at 744, 771.
9 Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 778.
10 Passell, The Deterrence Eflct of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REV. 61
(1975).

1983]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE

929

mating deterrent effects have been widely recognized and will not be
repeated here."' Passell's results for 1950 were based on an analysis of
data for the forty-one states for which data were available; his findings
for 1960 were based on data for forty-four such states. Passell reported
results under both the ordinary and the two-stage least-squares estimating techniques, both with and without a binary Southern variable, using
both the linear and loglinear models, and using various constructions of
the execution rate variable. He concluded with the statement: "We
know of no reasonable way of interpreting the cross-section data that
12
would lend support to the deterrence hypothesis."'
While there are important differences in the approaches employed
by Passell and Ehrlich,' 3 the similarities are extraordinary: both Passell
and Ehrlich examined data for cross-sections of states for 1950; both
used an approximation of the loglinear regression model; both used unweighted regressions; both used FBI homicide data and National Prisoner Statistics data on executions and murder convictions; and both
formed the execution rate variable alternatively as the coincident ratio
of executions to convictions, as a lagged ratio, and as a ratio of the fouryear mean number of executions to the number of convictions. In addition, both incorporated the following as control variables: median time
served in prison by convicted murderers; percent of the resident population between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four; percent of families in
poverty; and a race variable. Given these similarities, it can only be
regarded as astounding that Passell finds no evidence that the death
penalty deters homicide while Ehrlich's results suggest that it does
deter. 14
11 See id. at 62; EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 742; Forst, The Deterrent Eect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-StateAnalysis of the 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REv. 745-47 (1977); Klein, supra note 4,
at 341-42.
12 Passell, supra note 10, at 80.
13 Two fundamental differences are discussed in detail below. See infia notes 15-29 and
accompanying text. These two differences relate to Passell's and Ehrlich's assumptions about
the specification of the homicide function and their willingness to accept results for the 1960
cross-section of states. Other differences also may have contributed to the divergence in Ehrlich's findings from those of Passell. Unlike Passell, Ehrlich incorporated variables reflecting
median family income, proportion of residents living in urban places, and whether the state
was an execution state (the use of which was not found to alter materially Ehrlich's deterrence
finding). Further, whereas Passell used only unweighted regressions, Ehrlich used both
weighted and unweighted regressions, again with similar results in each instance. On the
other hand, Passell's results were reported both with and without a Southern dummy variable
(with similar results in each case), whereas Ehrlich did not incorporate this variable.
The results of both Ehrlich's and Passell's robustness tests, together with results reported
below, see infra Tables I and 2, suggest that the sharp contrast in their respective conclusions
has less to do with these latter differences than with assumptions about the specification of the
homicide function and the use of the 1960 cross-section.
14 It is noteworthy that using unweighted regression with the 1950 cross-section (which
comes as close to Passell's analytic structure as any employed by Ehrlich), Ehrlich's result for
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CROSS SECTION

Equally astounding is the fact that Passell reports results for the
1960 cross-section of states, while Ehrlich does not. Ehrlich gives two
reasons for not analyzing the 1960 cross-section of states. One reason is
that the "number of executions per state in a given year" was too small
in 1960-the "large percentage changes from year to year. . . amount
to severe 'sampling errors."'1 5 His other reason for not analyzing the
1960 data is that the cross-state variation in the level of enforcement of
capital punishment was insufficient to provide a meaningful test of the
deterrence hypothesis. 1 6 Neither reason holds up under scrutiny.
First, it is irrelevant that the percentage change in the number of
executions from year to year was larger in many states in 1960 than in
1940 or 1950, the years for which Ehrlich did report results. If a case
were to be made against the use of the 1960 cross-section based on "sampling errors," it should be based on year-to-year dift'rences in the execution rate, not percentage changes in the number of executions.
Percentage changes in the number of executions are surely large, but
neither the percentage changes nor the number of executions are very
relevant to sampling error in the key independent variable-the execution rate. Moreover, the random part of the fluctuations in the execution rate that does exist, small as it is, has been virtually eliminated
through the statistical smoothing procedures employed by Ehrlich and
17
others.
Ehrlich's second justification for not analyzing the 1960 cross-section data is that the level of enforcement of capital punishment did not
vary enough from one state to the next in that year to allow a meaningful test of the deterrence hypothesis. It is, of course, not obvious what
level of variation in an independent variable is enough to provide a
meaningful test of a hypothesis. If the level of variation in the execution
the execution rate variable was among the least significant reported for this variable in his
1977 article (t = -1.38).
Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 753. Under weighted regression, or using
the 1940 cross-section of states, or both, he obtained t-statistics in the neighborhood of-3.5 to
-5.0. Id. at 752-53.
15 Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 786.
16 Id. at 742, 748-49, 786.
17 The year-to-year fluctuations in the execution rate that do exist have been damped
through the application of two-stage least-squares estimates, Forst, supra note 11, at 757-58;
Passell, supra note 10, at 73-77, and with the use of the average number of executions over
three- to five-year periods, Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 750-54; Forst, supra note 11, at 756-57;
Passell, supra note 10, at 68. Even in the absence of these data smoothing procedures, however, one would expect the estimates of the ratio of executions to homicide convictions for
states to be considerably less accurate for 1940 and 1950 than for more recent periods. The
estimates of the number of state homicide convictions used by Ehrlich for 1940 and 1950 are
based on murder convictions only, Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 774-75; the general superiority of
the more recent data is discussed below. See infia note 20.
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rate variable for which Ehrlich estimated deterrent effects in his timeseries analysis can be accepted as sufficient, however, then the level for
the 1960 cross-section of states should also be considered sufficient. The
coefficient of variation in the execution rate is in fact larger for the 1960
cross-section of states than for Ehrlich's aggregate time series.18 Under

the circumstances, Professor Ehrlich's decision not to report results for
the 1960 cross-section appears to represent another instance of a tendency, which has been noted earlier,' 9 for Ehrlich to select analytic options that produce findings of deterrence when the case for options that
produce different results is at least as strong.
Actually, cross-state data for 1960 and the decade that followed are

especially worthy of analysis. First, the more recent data have been
widely acknowledged to be more accurate than the earlier data.2 0 Second, and perhaps most important, much of the criticism of Ehrlich's
1975 results centers on lack of robustness of those findings with respect
to the inclusion of more recent data;2' hence, it surely seems in order to
test the deterrence hypothesis using cross-sectional data for this period in
controversy. Finally, to the extent that the magnitude of the deterrent
effect is itself a function of other factors, 22 the current deterrent effect of
the death penalty may be estimated more reliably with data that reflect
more recent conditions.
18 I calculate the coefficient of variation equal to 1.54 for the execution rate, based on
data for 33 states for which information about executions and convictions are available for
1960. It is 1.34 based on a three-year average of executions centered about 1960. For the
aggregate time-series data, on the other hand, the coefficient of variation for the execution
rate for the period 1933 to 1969 is 0.946, based on an independent calculation using Ehrlich's
data sources. The source of the 1960 state data is the FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS (1960). Ehrlich's data sources for his 1975 article are given in
an unpublished memorandum prepared by Ehrlich in May 1975.
19 See Klein, supra note 4, at 343-57.
20 Ehrlich has indicated that, in general, the more recent data are superior. Ehrlich, The
Deterrent Eect of Criminal Law Enforcement, I J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 272 (1972). He has also
reported results for the 1960 cross-section in a study that found deterrent effects for noncapital sanctions. Ehrlich, Participationin Illegitimate Activities: A Theoreticaland EmpiricalInvestigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973) [hereinafter Ehrlich, Participationin Illegitimate Activities]. He
has further pointed out that state data on the numbers of homicides and homicide convictions
are, in particular, inferior for the 1940 and 1950 cross-section of states. Ehrlich, supra note 7,
at 775, 779, 785. Whereas the number of homicides in each state for 1960 is based on total
homicides reported by the police, the numbers for 1940 and 1950 are based on samples of
police departments drawn only from urban areas. Klein has shown that such errors do'not, in
general, bias the coefficients of the sanction variables toward zero. See Klein, supra note 4, at
347-49.
21 See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 4, at 197-204; Klein, supra note 4, at 353-55; Passell &
Taylor, supra note 4, at 446-48.
22 See in/fa text accompanying note 32.
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ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE FORM OF THE HOMICIDE FUNCTION

A second major problem with estimates of the deterrent effect of
capital punishment is their lack of robustness with respect to the mathematical specification of the homicide function. In particular, deterrence
has been found to appear stronger when the homicide function is assumed to be loglinear than when it is assumed to be linear. This phenomenon has been found in analyses of both time-series23 and crosssectional data.2 4 Ehrlich rejected the simple linear model based upon
an application of the Box and Cox tests for optimal transformations to a
class of power transformations, 25 concluding that the loglinear model
"cannot be rejected as optimal. ' 26
,The execution rate variable, however, takes on values of zero in
both of Ehrlich's empirical analyses of the deterrent effect of capital
punishment. Since the logarithmic function is undefined at zero, one
must reject the loglinear specification as a feasible model. Thus, it is
safe to assert that the homicide function is, in fact, neither linear nor
loglinear. Further, for that matter, we cannot be sure that it is even
within the class of power transformations considered by Ehrlich, since
he finds the logarithmic form (an inadmissible specification) to be
"unambiguously . . . super[ior]" to all other power transformations
27
considered.
Assumptions about the precise form of the homicide function need
not, however, stand in the way of accurate estimation of the average
deterrent effect of the death penalty. Indeed, the deterrent effect is typically estimated as a constant trade-off number, as though the underlying
function were linear, even when the homicide function is assumed to be
nonlinear.2 8 Given the lack of robustness of the previous findings with
respect to the specification of the homicide function, an estimation procedure that is relatively insensitive to the precise form of this function
would appear to be in order.
Instead of assuming that the homicide function is of a particular
form, one need only assume that it is continuous and estimate the relevant parameters of the differential of the function. One advantage of
23 See Bowers & Pierce,supra note 4, at 199-203; Klein, supra note 4, at 356-57; Passell &
Taylor, supra note 4, at 448-49.
24 See Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 758-59.
25 Id. at 781-83.
26 Id. at 760.
27 Id.

28 For example, Ehrlich has estimated an average trade-off of eight lives saved for each
execution for the period 1933 to 1967 in the United States based on loglinear regression estimates. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 398. Subsequently, he estimated an average trade-off in the
neighborhood of 20 to 24 lives saved, based on the application of a loglinear model to state
data for 1940 and 1950. Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 779.
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this approach is that it exploits the fact that the differential of any continuous homicide rate function is always of the additive form, regardless
of the particular form of the homicide function. This property is described more fully in the Appendix.
A second advantage of estimating the differential of the homicide
function, rather than the homicide function itself, is that it focuses on
changes in the variables of interest rather than on the levels of the variables. The question of deterrence deals primarily with the effect of
change in a sanction variable on a crime rate measure. An estimation
procedure based upon actual changes in the relevant variables in a
cross-section of jurisdictions provides a more sensitive and direct test of
the deterrence hypothesis than a procedure based on the levels of the
variables in the cross-section. In addition, Klein has acknowledged that
forming parameter estimates from the changes in variables in two successive cross-sections can eliminate biases due to spatial heterogeneity,
biases that are common to estimates based on conventional analyses of
29
cross-sectional data.
III.

ANALYSIS OF STATE DATA FOR

1960

TO

1970

The decade from 1960 to 1970 provides a particularly important
opportunity to test the hypothesis that the death penalty deters homicide. For many states, this period represented an ending of capital punishment; for the other states, capital punishment had already been
abolished, either de jure or de facto, prior to 1960. Under the theory
that the death penalty deters homicide, one would predict that the
homicide rate would have increased more in those states in which use of
capital punishment ended during the 1960's than in the states in which
the death penalty was not being used in the first place. One would further predict that the homicide rate would have increased most in the
states with the greatest decline in the use of capital punishment-that
is, those states with the highest execution rates in and around the beginning of the decade.
Since 1960 and 1970 are census years, with richer data available
than in off-census years, one can examine the accuracy of these predictions by accounting for temporal changes in a host of other factors associated with the explosion in the homicide rate in the United States
during that decade.30 In addition, these two census years complement
the census years selected in Ehrlich's 1977 cross-sectional study-1940
and 1950.
29 L. Klein, A TEXTBOOK OF ECONOMETRICS 350, 358 (1974).
30 Homicides increased by more than 50% in the 1960's-from 5.1 homicides per 100,000
residents in 1960 to 7.8 in 1970. Forst, suwpra note 11, at 748.
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Data for the 1960's are especially important, however, because they
permit scrutiny of that crucial period on which previous time-series findings of a deterrent effect of capital punishment, derived from aggregate
United States data, have been found to rely so heavily.3 ' After decades
of steady decline, the homicide rate rose sharply during the 1960's-the
same decade in which use of the death penalty was stopped. It is surely
in order to examine the 1960's more closely to establish whether the
homicide rate increase was in fact related to the discontinuation of the
death penalty.
To test the deterrent effect of the death penalty during the 1960's,
one must analytically distinguish the deterrent effect of the death penalty from the other factors that significantly affected the homicide rate
during that decade. The full set of variables considered plausible as
homicide rate determinants (and for which data were available) include
the following: the probability of execution given conviction, 32 Peic; the
rate at which homicides result in conviction, C/Q the average prison
term served by persons convicted of homicide and released in the base
year; proportion of families in poverty, Pov; proportion of nonwhites,
NW; median family income, Y; the non-homicide crime rate, Cr; proportion of residents of the ages twenty-one to twenty-four; proportion of
males; proportion of urban residents; school enrollment rate; resident
population; divorce rate; proportion of adults employed; and a binary
Southern variable.3 3 The failure of changes in most of these variables to
emerge as significant correlates of the increase in the homicide rate from
34
1960 to 1970 suggests the model.
h = f (Peic, C/Q Pov, NW, Y, Cr)

(1)

The theory behind the inclusion of sanction variables in a crime
equation (in this case Pelc and C/Q) has been well-developed by Becker, 35 Ehrlich, 36 and others, and needs no further elaboration here. The
income and race variables are included as statistical controls: while theories about their links with crime are both important and abundant,
those theories lie outside the context of this paper. The rate at which
31 See sources cited supra note 21 and accompanying text.
32 Hereinafter this variable will be referred to as the execution rate.
33 The data sources are given in Forst, supra note 11, at 765-67. Symbols are given in text
only for those variables that were found to be significant.
34 Of the six independent variables shown in Equation (1), all but Pelc had t-statistics that
exceeded 1.64 in absolute value (i.e., significant at .10) in the full regression equation. Pe/c is
included here because it is the variable of primary interest. The full model was estimated
with an ordinary least-squares regression analysis of the 33 states for which data were complete for both 1960 and 1970.
35 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169-217 (1968).
36 See Ehrlich, supra note 3; Ehrlich, Participationin Illegitimate Activities, supra note 20.
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crimes other than homicide are committed is included to ensure that the
deterrence estimates are not contaminated by the omission of other fac37
tors that generally caused crime to increase from 1960 to 1970.
Following the discussion of the previous section and the technical
Appendix, we incorporate these variables in an empirical counterpart to
Equation (1):
Ah = a + b e APelc + cl .A(C/A) + c 2 * APov
+ c 4 * AY + c 5 e ACr,

+ c3 *

ANW
(2)

where A represents the 1970 value of a variable minus the 1960 value.
This approximation to the differential of the homicide rate serves as a
basis for the estimates shown in Table 1.38 Equations (a) through (d)
form the variable Pe/c in four different ways, to ensure that the results
are robust with respect to alternative ways of measuring the independent variable of primary interest. The first construction, E/C, is based on
executions and murder convictions in the same year. Equation (b) uses
executions in the year after the convictions, so that Pe/c here represents
39
an objective forecast of the probability of execution given conviction.
Equation (c) constructs the numerator of the execution rate as the average annual number of executions for the three-year period centered
about the base year, to reduce random error in the execution rate variable. 40 Equation (d) is also designed to reduce this error and to eliminate
any bias resulting from the reverse effect that changes in the homicide
rate may have on the execution rate. Equation (e) tests the deterrence
hypothesis based on data for all fifty states by replacing the variables
E/C and C/Q with the single variable E/Q. Equation (f) is the same as
(a) except that the variable Cr is excluded to eliminate any biases result41
ing from the influence of other included variables on the variable Cr.
37 A rationale for the inclusion of the non-homicide rate variable is given in Klein, supra
note 4, at 355-56. This variable, however, is likely to be determined by other variables in the
right-hand side of (1), so that its inclusion as a regressor could distort our inferences. Hence,
results are reported below both with and without Cr.
38 The intercept coefficient, a, can be interpreted as a balancing term that reflects the net

effect of omitted variables and stochastic measurement errors in the included variables. The
other coefficients can be interpreted as average values of the partial differential coefficients for
each of the independent variables. The coefficients of all equations in Table 1 other than (d)
are estimated using ordinary least-squares regression analysis; equation (d) is estimated using
a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression analysis, with the execution rate variable endogenized as noted in the table.
39 Ehrlich estimated the average lag from conviction to execution to be about 12 to 16
months. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 407. I have estimated it in the same vicinity-14 months.
Forst, supra note 11, at 756 n.50.
40 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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None of these six formulations shows the execution rate to be a deterrent against homicides. In two instances, (a) and (d), the result for
this variable is consistent with the hypothesis that executions, on balance,provoke homicides. More will be said about this hypothesis in the
concluding section.
The results for the conviction rate variable, C/Q on the other
hand, are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis. While this finding
is likely to be somewhat exaggerated by measurement errors in the
number of homicides (a data element that appears both as the numerator of the dependent variable and as the denominator of the homicide
conviction rate), the finding nonetheless does provide supp6rt for the
theory that homicides are averted by the conviction and incarceration of
42
homicide offenders.
Findings similar to those of Table 1 are obtained when each observation is weighted by the square root of the 1960 state population, to
reduce potential bias in the regression estimates associated with heteroscedasticity.4 3 These results are shown in Table 2. It should be noted
that while the standard errors tend to be slightly larger in Table 2 than
in Table 1, the results are substantively quite similar.
IV.

CONCLUSION

These findings, as well as earlier ones by Passell, Sellin, Schuessler,
Zeisel, and others, do not invalidate the theory that capital punishment
occasionally may deter individuals from committing homicides, nor do
they invalidate the general theory of deterrence. They do suggest, however, that on balance the death penalty does not have a perceptible influence on the homicide rate. Even if some people are in fact deterred
from committing murder by the prospect of being executed rather than
subjected to a lengthy term of imprisonment, the available evidence suggests that as many people, and perhaps more, are provoked to commit
murder by the existence of the death penalty.
Several different mechanisms may underlie the tendency of capital
42 Note that measurement errors in the number of homicides are not sufficient to produce
an artificial appearance of deterrence in equation (e) of Table 1, where the potential for such
distortion is also present. A more thorough treatment of this bias is presented by Klein, supra
note 4, at 347-49.
43 "Heteroscedasticity" refers to the condition in which the variance of the dependent
variable is not constant--specifically, the case in which the variance is related to the value of
an independent variable. Heteroscedasticity is a problem in regression analysis because more
weight tends to be given to observations with larger error variances. It is especially common
in regression analyses involving cross-sectional data in which the observations consist of geographic units of varying population sizes. The standard correction in such a case is to weight
each observation by the square root of the population for that observation.
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punishment actually to provoke murder. First, as Ehrlich suggested, 4 4
the deterrent effect of capital punishment may be offset by the incentive
it may create for murderers to kill policemen, witnesses, and others who
could help to bring about their arrest, conviction and execution. Second, judges and juries may be less inclined to convict murderers when
the risk of execution is high, in which case both the incapacitation and
deterrent (both general and individual) benefits of conviction would be
lessened.4 5 Third, capital punishment provides a unique opportunity to
commit suicide by having the state willfully and legally perform the killing.4 6 Fourth, use of the death penalty by the state, despite an intention
to convey the message that killing is unacceptable, may convey the opposite message to the general public. "Do as we do" may thus overpower "do as we say." By raising the sanction stakes from life imprisonment to death, the state may unwittingly induce criminals to "up the
crime ante" and respond in kind with more homicides.
What, then, are we to make of the apparent conflict in evidence
between the findings of Isaac Ehrlich, on the one hand, and those reported here (and by Passell, Zeisel, Bowers and Pierce, Schuessler, and
Sellin), on the other? The evidence to date suggests that Ehrlich's findings are a product of his strong a priori belief in the theory of deterrence; 47 the availability of a variety of small, volatile data sets; and a
larger variety of options for analyzing these data sets. A sufficiently
strong a priori belief in anything can induce even the most well-intentioned of scientists to gravitate toward findings that support the belief.
Failure of the evidence to support the deterrent effect of the death
penalty may be discomfitting to all who, through a personal experience,
believe that sanctions influence behavior. We know that we are deterred
by fines and other sanctions that apply to violations of traffic rules, income tax laws, and other matters of direct personal experience. Moreover, we all have some vague notion of how terrible it must be to be
44 See Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 398.
45 Id. at 405. "Individual deterrence" refers to the tendency for a sanction to control the

subsequent behavior of the offender sanctioned; "general deterrence" refers to the tendency
for a sanction to control the behavior of others.
46 Evidence of such behavior has been described by several commentators. See E. ABDEL
FATrAH, A STUDY OF THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT WITH SPECIAL

REFERENCE TO THE CANADIAN SITUATION, 39-40 (1972); Diamond, Murder and the Death Penalty: A Case Report, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 445 (H. Bedau & C.
Pierce eds. 1976); Solomon, CapitalPunishment as Suicide and as Murder, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 432 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976); West, PsychiatrcRe ctions on the Death Penaly, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 426-27 (H. Bedau
& C. Pierce eds. 1976); Von Weber, SelbstmordalsMordmotiv, MONATSSCHRIFT FUR KRIMINOLOGIE UND STRAFRECHTSREFORM 61 (1937).
47 See Ehrlich, supra note 3; Ehrlich, supra note 7; Ehrlich, Participationin Illegal Activities,
supra note 20.

BRIAN FORST

[Vol. 74

executed. Hence, it might seem difficult to imagine that others are not
deterred by the death penalty. Widespread public support for capital
punishment, fed by frustration about crime and by a retributive zeal, is
probably rooted in such personal beliefs about the efficacy of a strategy
of deterrence.
As Anthony Amsterdam has observed, however, the personal experiences and beliefs of social scientists and the vast majority of the general
public in fact may bear little resemblance to the experiences and beliefs
of those predisposed to commit murder.4 8 The behavior of the violenceprone minority simply may not correspond to our tidy general theories
of human behavior, such as those embodied in the hypothesis that the
death penalty deters murder. The evidence suggests that people prone
to criminal violence may be as inclined to respond to an increased use of
the death penalty by committing more homicides as they are to respond
by committing fewer. The vast majority of society, on the other hand, is
likely to be sufficiently deterred by social and legal sanctions other than
the death penalty to render capital punishment a superfluous sanction
for them. In short, the deterrence theory may apply to most sanctions,
but the evidence indicates that the death penalty is an important exception, one for which other theories of behavior appear to be more
applicable.
48 Amsterdam, CapitalPunirhment, 5 THE STANFORD MAGAZINE at 42 (1977). According
to Amsterdam, the "real mainstay" of the general theory of deterrence is intuition, not
evidence:
You and I ask ourselves: we are not afraid to die? Of course! Would the threat of death,
then, not intimidate us to forbear from a criminal act? Certainly! Therefore, capital
punishment must be a deterrent. The trouble with this intuition is that the people who
are doing the reasoning and the people who are doing the murdering are not the same
people. You and I do not commit murder for a lot of reasons other than the death
penalty. The death penalty might perhaps also deter us from murdering-but altogether needlessly, since we would not murder with it or without it. Those who are sufficiently dissocialized to murder are not responding to the world in the way that we are,
and we simply cannot "intuit" their thinking processes from ours.
Id. at 47. Amsterdam has suggested to the author that persons predisposed to commit murder
may tend to be moved by a variety of specific psychologies different from those that characterize the behavior of others. Letter from Anthony Amsterdam to Brian Forst (Nov. 22,
1982). One such difference could be a tendency for murderers to be more risk-prone than
others-risk-prone, that is, not only in the conventional von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility sense (i.e., characterized by preference for a gamble involving an expected return that
is smaller than the amount of the bet), but in the unconventional sense that a gamble involving enormous negative stakes may be more attractive than an otherwise identical gamble with
smaller negative stakes. Institution of the death penalty thus may tend to cause the minority
who are predisposed to murder to be even more inclined to commit the crime than before.
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APPENDIX

Rigorous empirical analysis of deterrence requires a statistical procedure that can distinguish the effects of criminal sanctions from other
factors that affect crime rates (e.g., demographic and economic variables). The conventional approach for making such a distinction is to
analyze the data using a multiple regression program on a computer.
The estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2, like conventional estimates of
deterrent effects, are derived from regression analysis.
The estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2 differ from conventional
regression estimates, however, in that they are based on a less restrictive
assumption about the mathematical form of the regression equation. As
noted in the main text of this Article, see supra text accompanying notes
23-27, conventional regression estimates of deterrent effects are highly
sensitive to assumptions about the form of the regression equation (e.g.,
whether it is assumed to be purely linear or linear in the logarithms of
variables). A less restrictive approach is to assume only that the crime
rate equation is a continuous function; one may then estimate the differential of the function rather than the crime rate equation itself. The
differential of any continuous crime rate equation is additive and approximately linear, regardless of the precise specification of the crime
rate equation.
Expressed symbolically, the differential equation corresponding to
any continuous crime rate function,
h = f*x, X2,...Xn),
is always of the additive form
8h
Sh
dh
dx, + dx2 +.

Sh
.+ -

dx,,

(A2)

regardless of the particular form of Equation (Al). Denoting h as the
homicide rate and x, as the execution rate, the average trade-off between executions and homicides can be obtained directly by estimating
the partial differential coefficient,
Sh
via regression analysis. While this coefficient will, in fact, be a constant
only when Equation (Al) is linear, the coefficients obtained by estimating the additive expression, (A2), with a linear regression model will
approximate the average trade-offs, which are of primary interest, even
if Equation (Al) is nonlinear.
Suppose, for example, that the homicide function were of the loglinear form,

b xb22...xn
b2
b,
h=ax',
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8h
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and which, at a particular margin, would be approximately
dh = h0o(bdx 1

+ b 2 dx 2 +.

..

+

bndx)

.

The coefficients of primary interest are customarily estimated either
by assuming that Equation (Al) is linear and estimating the coefficients
of interest directly, or by assuming that the equation is nonlinear and
estimating the parameters of the function and then calculating the coefficients of interest at the average values of the relevant variables. Thus,
even when nonlinearity is assumed, the effects of primary interest are
customarily expressed as constants.
Under the alternative method used here, those constants are estimated directly as the partial differential coefficients,
8h
8xi

of expression (A2). Accordingly, the observations consist of measures of
changes in the variables, corresponding to dh and the dxi; rather than
measures of the levels of the variables, as in conventional regression
applications.

